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POPULATION-BASED LEGAL ANALYSIS:
BRIDGING THE INTERDISCIPLINARY
CHASM THROUGH PUBLIC
HEALTH IN LAW
Wendy E. Parmet
Introduction
It is probably trite to note that legal scholarship has become increasingly
interdisciplinary, a development that has wrought both promises and perils.1
In this essay, I expand upon that observation by introducing my own
contribution to interdisciplinary legal scholarship, which I call populationbased legal analysis.2 By integrating public health’s norms, perspectives, and
methodologies into legal analysis, I will argue, population-based legal analysis
can transcend the chasm that lies between legal scholarship about nonlegal
issues on the one hand, and nonlegal scholarship about law and its eﬀects on
society on the other.
I begin by mapping that chasm. After discussing what is required to cross
the divide and achieve a thick form of interdisciplinarity, I describe populationbased legal analysis. I explain how it merges public health into law, and why
public health’s merger into law is deeper and richer than that of many other
disciplines. I conclude by highlighting some challenges that remain.


Wendy E. Parmet is Associate Dean for Interdisciplinary Education and Research Support at
Northeastern University School of Law and Matthews Distinguished University Professor of Law
and Professor of Public Policy and Urban Aﬀairs, Northeastern University. She expresses many
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1.

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 95052 (1996); Dave Owen & Caroline Noblet, Interdisciplinary Research and Environmental Law, 41
ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 892-900 (2014); Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1314, 1317-20, 1325 (2002); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1217, 1217-20 (2002).

2.

I developed this concept most fully in WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH &
THE LAW 51-59 (2009) [hereinafter PARMET, POPULATIONS].
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There is certainly no need to rehash here the myriad reasons for the ascent of
interdisciplinary legal scholarship. In our postlegal-realist world, it is untenable
to suggest that the law is wholly autonomous,3 or that legal scholarship about
social, economic, or scientiﬁc questions should be uninformed by the expertise
that relevant nonlegal ﬁelds may provide. Imagine what scholarship regarding
climate change would look like without any consideration of climate science!
Or consider a discussion of the application of patent law to biotechnology that
was oblivious of human genetics. Clearly any serious scholarship regarding
the application of the law to nonlegal domains requires some consideration
of the expertise from those domains. Likewise, there can be little doubt that
other disciplines,4 both empirical and conceptual, can oﬀer powerful tools for
enhancing our understanding of the legal system as well as the law’s impact
on the social environment.5 Thus my own ﬁeld of public health law has seen
the growth of what Scott Burris and colleagues term “legal epidemiology,”
the empirical study of law’s impact on population health.6 We may all believe
that seat belt laws save lives, or that laws criminalizing the sexual transmission
of HIV are ineﬀective in reducing the spread of the virus, but only empirical
research can tell us whether our suppositions have validity.
Nevertheless, although interdisciplinary research is both necessary and
extraordinarily valuable, its proliferation has posed serious challenges
to our ﬁeld. One commonly heard complaint is that the move toward
interdisciplinarity has produced works that are esoteric, self-indulgent, and
increasingly divorced from the concerns of the bench and bar.7 A diﬀerent
charge is that what passes for interdisciplinary scholarship is often simply
poor nonlegal scholarship.8 Others argue that the move to interdisciplinarity
3.

Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV.
761, 766-75 (1987); Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1219 (“But law, though a discipline, is not and
never has been an autonomous discipline.”). Judge Posner notes, however, that despite the
legal realist critique of law’s autonomy, the conception of law as autonomous managed to
hold sway through the 1950s and 1960s. Posner, supra, at 762-66.

4.

For a discussion of what constitutes a discipline, see Balkin, supra note 1, at 952-57.

5.

Richard A. Posner, The State of Legal Scholarship Today, 97 GEO. L.J. 845, 851-52 (2009).

6.

Scott Burris et al., A Transdisciplinary Approach to Public Health Law: The Emerging Practice of Legal
Epidemiology, 37 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 135, 139-41 (2016).

7.

Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A
Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191, 2192 (1993); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).

8.

Kathryn Zeiler, The Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Where Might We Go From Here? 66 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 78, 78 (2016) (noting that the “average quality of empirical studies published
in student-edited law reviews is undoubtedly lower than those published in peer-reviewed
journals.”). This is not a new charge. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Intellectural Voyeurism in Legal
Scholarship, 4 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 79, 80 (1992) (charging that much of interdisciplinary
work is “superﬁcial and ill-informed treatment of serious ideas”); Mark A. Graber, Law and
Sports Oﬃciating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 293, 304
(1999) (“The probability of error is particularly high when law professors write on non-legal
subjects.”).
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has increased the fragmentation within legal scholarship, as legal scholars with
training in diﬀerent disciplines employ distinct disciplinary methodologies.9
Together these critiques create, as Jack Balkin stated back in 1996, “a
profound sense of questioning about the purposes of legal scholarship,
a profound sense of concern about the fracturing of legal scholarship into
mutually incomprehensible camps, and a profound sense of worry about the
increasing and, for many, undesirable isolation of legal scholarship from the
concerns of the legal profession, the bench, and the bar. From this standpoint,
interdisciplinary scholarship might seem to be a threat to the self-identity
of the legal professor and the legal academy, and is consequently embattled
or under siege.”10 The questions raised by this existential crisis are whether
interdisciplinary legal scholarship can remain legal scholarship, and hence,
whether legal scholarship can survive the move to interdisciplinarity.
To answer those questions, it is useful to identify the two diﬀerent sides
of the interdisciplinary divide.11 On one side scholars use the tools (often
empirical and quantitative) of nonlegal disciplines to study law’s formation,
the workings of the legal system, and its eﬀect on the greater society.12 Much
of this scholarship is produced by the increasing number of law faculty who
possess Ph.D.s in other disciplines.13 This scholarship often looks, feels,
and smells like the scholarship that is produced by our nonlegal colleagues.
For example, in public health law, there is a plethora of empirical research
concerning the impact of discrete public health laws on public health.14
Most of this research relies on epidemiology, econometric modeling, or
other quantitative methodologies. Lawyers may be valuable or even essential
members of the teams that conduct such research, but it’s often hard to see
how this scholarship is legal scholarship, at least as that has traditionally been
understood,15 as opposed to empirical research about law.
9.

Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Character of Legal Theory, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 671, 672
(2011).

10.

Balkin, supra note 1, at 950.

11.

Balkin describes several types of interdisciplinary work, two of which are those discussed
below. Another form he identiﬁes “would involve treating legal materials as though they
were the sorts of materials studied in other disciplines.” Id. at 958. For a further discussion of
an additional approach identiﬁed by Balkin, see note 19, infra.

12.

Hanoch Dagan and Roy Kreitner refer to this side of the chasm as “intradisciplinarity,”
which they distinguish from “interdisciplinarity,” which appears in their terminology to be
a thicker form of the application of the norms and methods of legal scholarship to nonlegal
disciplines. Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Interdisciplinary Party, 1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L.
23, 25-31 (2014) [hereinafter Dagan & Kreitner, Interdisciplinary].

13.

Lynn M. LoPucki, Dawn of the Discipline-Based Law Faculty, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 506 (2016)
(reporting that 21% of tenure-track entry-level hires in American law schools between 2011
and 2015 had Ph.D.s).

14.

Burris et al., supra note 6, at 135, 136.

15.

See text accompanying note 16, infra.
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On the other side of the chasm lies legal scholarship that applies traditional
methods of legal analysis, which remain primarily doctrinal and normative,16
to the ﬁndings or literature created by another ﬁeld. This type of scholarship,
which is quite common in the ﬁeld of public health law, can be extremely
valuable. Indeed, once we recognize that law is not wholly autonomous, we
must concede that the consideration of nonlegal knowledge is essential for
many scholarly projects. But the interdisciplinarity of such scholarship often
remains thin. At times this is because the legal scholar lacks suﬃcient expertise
in the nonlegal materials that are used. But even when the law is applied to
nonlegal ﬁelds with an expert’s understanding, the interdisciplinarity is thin
as long as the legal scholar’s approach to the material remains solely within
the legal tradition. In such cases, the legal scholar is using the knowledge of
the nonlegal ﬁeld much as the litigator uses an expert witness: as the source of
facts from which legal conclusions can be drawn.
To cross the chasm between nonlegal scholarship about law on the one side
and traditional legal scholarship about nonlegal matters on the other side, to
achieve a thick form of interdisciplinarity, or what Scott Burris and colleagues
term “transdiciplinarity,”17 the scholar must take both the traditions of legal
scholarship and those of the disciplinary partner seriously. Hanoch Dagan
and Roy Kreitner explain that this requires reliance “on both a theory (explicit
or implicit) of the way law’s power and its normativity align, and an account of
the way in which this discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally.”18
In other words, to be legal scholarship, interdisciplinary scholarship must
engage with law’s normativity as well as its coerciveness. It must embody the
norms of law, while providing rationales for its justiﬁcation and limitations.
Further, as Burris and colleagues suggest, to be interdisciplinary in the
thick sense of the term, legal scholarship must also assimilate the normativity
and methodologies of the other discipline.19 Thus, at least in its thick form,
interdisciplinary legal scholarship is neither the application of the law to
the other discipline nor the use of the other discipline to study law. It is the
integration of the other discipline with the law.20
With many nonlegal disciplines, I suspect, this integration may be diﬃcult
if not impossible to achieve precisely because the other discipline’s normativity
(to the extent that it exists) lies so far from law’s own normativity as to preclude
16.

See Balkin supra note 1, at 959; Paul Stancil, The Legal Academy as Dinner Party: (A Short) Manifesto
on the Necessity of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1577. In other words, the
legal scholar’s modality remains within the legal tradition.

17.

Burris et al., supra note 6, at 141.

18.

Dagan & Kreitner, Interdisciplinary, supra note 12, at 25.

19.

See Burris et al., supra note 6, at 141.

20.

This is close to what Jack Balkin calls the fourth approach to interdisciplinary legal
scholarship, which involves “merging and marrying the questions and assumptions of
diﬀerent disciplines.” Balkin, supra note 1, at 959. He claims that this is the “hardest and
most unusual” form of interdisciplinarity, “because without a community of disciplinary
adherents, there really can be no discipline.” Id.
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a smooth assimilation. For example, it is common to ﬁnd legal scholarship
that cites to the expertise of chemistry in analyzing issues relating to toxic torts
or environmental law. One can also imagine scholarship that attempts to apply
at least some of the disciplinary tools of chemistry (the scientiﬁc method) to
law.21 It is hard, however, to conceive of a form of scholarship that blends
both these methods and the norms of chemistry, such as they are, with those
of law. In contrast, such a merger has been possible with law and economics
precisely because the underlying utilitarian and welfarist norms of neoclassical
economics align closely with signiﬁcant strands of Anglo-American law.22
Population-based legal analysis, which is based on the integration of law
with public health, oﬀers another example, albeit one with very diﬀerent
norms, perspectives, and approaches. In contrast to much of public health
legal scholarship,23 population-based legal analysis does not simply analyze
the law that relates to public health problems, such as tobacco or infectious
disease control. Nor is it limited to the use of public health science to study
the law’s impact on health. Rather, population-based legal analysis situates
public health’s norms, perspectives, and methodologies within law and uses
that approach to describe and critique the law,24 as it relates both to matters
that proximally aﬀect public health and those that do not.25 Thus just as
21.

It is challenging, however, to imagine applying speciﬁc laboratory techniques used by
chemists to law! Conversely, we have many examples of the application of the tools of
economics to law.

22.

E.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
(1987) (arguing that tort law should be understood as a system for achieving the eﬃcient
allocation of resources); Richard A. Posner, Richard T. Ely Lecture: The Law and Economics
Movement, 77 AMER. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (explaining that the law and economics movement
applies the open-ended concepts and assumptions of economics to a wide range of issues
that need not be limited to markets). A full discussion and critique of the law and economics
movement, and its various strands, is beyond the scope of this paper.

23.

There has been a rich debate as to whether public health law is its own ﬁeld. For a powerful
defense of public health law’s status as a legal ﬁeld, see Micah L. Berman, Deﬁning the Field of
Public Health Law, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 4584, 89 (2013); see also LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN
& LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (3d ed. 2016). Note
that both under Berman’s analysis and Gostin and Wiley’s deﬁnition, public health law itself,
and not just population-based legal analysis, share the perspectives and normativity of the
ﬁeld of public health. A major distinction between public health law and population-based
legal analysis is that the former is conﬁned to a distinct set of issues and questions relating
to public health, while the latter is not. See text accompanying note 22, supra. In addition,
population-based legal analysis more explicitly relies on public health methodologies. See
text accompanying notes 41-42, infra.

24.

Lawrence O. Gostin and Lindsay Wiley incorporate public health’s normativity into their
deﬁnition of the ﬁeld of public health law, claiming, “The prime objective of public health
law is to pursue the highest possible level of physical and mental health in the population,
consistent with the values of social justice.” GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 23, at 4. Micah
Berman likewise deﬁnes public health law in such a way as to incorporate the norms of
public health. See Berman, supra note 23, at 76-80.

25.

Given the breadth of the ﬁeld of public health, especially when the inﬂuence of socioecological factors is taken into account, this distinction is only one of degree. Without
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law and economics locates the norms of neoclassical economics within our
own legal tradition, and applies the norms, premises, and techniques of
neoclassical economics to a wide range of legal issues, only some of which are
overtly economic in nature, population-based legal analysis points to public
health’s own norms within our legal tradition. Population-based legal analysis
then applies those norms as well as public health’s perspectives and tools to
explicate legal issues that may or may not be obviously related to public health.
What does this mean? Space prevents a full analysis, but three key attributes
of population-based legal analysis warrant brief discussion. These relate to its
normativity, its perspective, and its methodology.
In 1988 the Institute of Medicine deﬁned public health as “what we, as a
society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy.”26
Although this statement was meant to be descriptive, like other deﬁnitions
of public health,27 it is implicitly normative, as it presumes that the health of
populations is not simply a condition that can be measured, but a good that
society should actively seek. Population-based legal analysis shares this norm
but locates it not only in the discipline of public health but also within the
law. Or, to put it another way, population-based legal analysis recognizes the
protection of population health as a goal or value that is embedded within the
legal system.28
This population health norm lies deep within the common law, as exempliﬁed
by the maxims of salus populi suprema lex and, less obviously, sic utere, as well as
in tort law’s emphasis on injury prevention.29 The norm is also deeply rooted
in the constitutional concept of the police power and formative conceptions
of federalism and due process. Even more fundamentally, the protection of
population health may be viewed as one of the motivating justiﬁcations for a
legal system.30 In eﬀect, we have laws in part to ensure our collective health
question, population-based legal analysis draws heavily upon and has been applied most
readily in conjunction with public health law. Indeed, Berman argues that the insights of
population-based legal analysis is one of deﬁning characteristics of the ﬁeld of public health
law. Berman, supra note 23, at 80.
26.

INST. OF MED., COMM. FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988).

27.

See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 7-13 (discussing diﬀerent deﬁnitions of public
health).

28.

Wendy E. Parmet, Health: Policy or Law? A Population-Based Analysis of the Supreme Court’s ACA Cases,
J. HEALTH POL’Y, POLITICS & L. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Parmet, Health: Policy or
Law?].

29.

Without question many tort scholars argue that tort law should and does emphasize norms
of corrective justice over injury prevention. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). My claim here is not that injury prevention is the
primary goal of tort law, but simply that concerns for injury prevention are also apparent in
tort cases and tort scholarship. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Weeks, Beyond Compensation: Using Torts to
Promote Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 27, 29-32, 39-58. (2007).

30.

GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 23, at 122-25; PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 35-42.
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and well-being, goods that we value and that we cannot achieve alone in a state
of nature.31 Thus public health’s normativity aligns with law’s normativity. As
a result, the merger of public health and law is inevitably tighter and more
susceptible to a thick form of interdisciplinarity than is the application of
many other nonlegal ﬁelds to law.
Importantly, contra salus populi suprema lex, my claim that population health is
a legal norm does not imply that population health ought to take precedence
over other legal norms, never mind binding legal rules. Nor does populationbased legal analysis assert that the norm is one that is always followed. Indeed,
I have argued elsewhere that the public health norm has faced signiﬁcant
erosion in recent decades.32 What is critical, however, is the assertion that the
legal system and public health have a shared normativity, which guides the
determination of the proper scope of law’s coerciveness.
A second, related attribute of population-based legal analysis is its adoption
of public health’s own population perspective. Critically, this adoption is
compelled by the population health norm. In other words, if law’s normativity
holds that coercion is justiﬁed and bounded in part by the goal of protecting
the health of populations, law must adopt a perspective that enables it to see
populations qua populations. That’s where the population perspective comes
in.
In brief, the population perspective prioritizes populations as opposed to
individuals, noting that individuals are situated within (multiple, overlapping,
and contingent) populations.33 In so doing, the population perspective is
heavily inﬂuenced by public health’s subﬁeld of epidemiology, including
especially social epidemiology, which studies the inﬂuence of social factors
on the prevalence of disease within populations. Hence the population
perspective recognizes that the choices individuals make, and the risks they
face, are signiﬁcantly determined by broader, so-called population-level
factors, including the social, physical, and legal environment, often coined the
social determinants of health.34
To understand this perspective, consider the lead crisis in Flint, Michigan.35
An individual perspective, such as that held by a typical clinician, and often
31.

This claim relies on the proposition that public health is at least in part a public good. See
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 23, at 8-9; Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E. Parmet, Solidarity and
Health: A Public Goods Justiﬁcation, 43 DIAMETROS 65, 66 (2015), http://www.diametros.iphils.
uj.edu.pl/index.php/diametros/article/download/715/769.

32.

See Parmet, Health: Policy or Law?, supra note 28.

33.

It is worth emphasizing that the population perspective does not presume that there is a
single population, “the public,” but rather that there are multiple, ever-changing populations
that face diﬀerent circumstances and upon which the law may have diﬀerent impacts. See
PARMET, POPULATIONS supra note 2, at 5-22.

34.

World Health Organization, Social Determinants of Health, http://www.who.int/social_determinants/
en/.

35.

See FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2016), https://www.michigan.
gov/documents/snyder/FWATF_FINAL_REPORT_21March2016_517805_7.pdf; Sara
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by courts, might ask why any individual child in Flint has elevated lead levels.
This might reveal that the child was exposed to lead in her home, or that
the child was genetically more susceptible to lead than other children. This
individualistic perspective might lead a clinician36 or court37 to conclude that
the child’s elevated lead level was caused by some choice of the child or the
parent, perhaps to live in a home with lead paint, or to use unﬁltered tap water.
Alternatively, the individualistic perspective may attribute responsibility to
another individual or set of individuals whose unlawful action may be found
to have caused the child’s exposure.
The population perspective, in contrast, compares rates of disease across
populations.38 If one contrasts the incidence of lead poisoning in children in
Flint with that of children in other communities, it becomes apparent that
something was going on at a population level, leading to a higher-than-typical
rate of lead poisoning for children in Flint. We can then begin to see that the
high levels of exposure found in any one individual was determined less by the
individual’s genes or behaviors than by her membership in a population that
was exposed to lead-tainted water. This may have resulted from the actions of
discrete individuals, but also from a wider array of social determinants, a point
that only becomes evident when we compare rates across multiple populations.
Hence notions of causation, responsibility, and risk look very diﬀerent from a
population perspective than from an individualistic lens.
The application of the public health norm when combined with a
population perspective leads public health practitioners and advocates to seek
interventions, including laws, that operate across one or more populations.
As epidemiologist Geoﬀrey Rose explains, “This is the attempt to control the
determinants of incidence, to lower the mean level of risk factors, to shift the
Ganim & Linh Tran, How Tap Water became Toxic in Flint, Michigan, CNN (Jan. 13, 2016), http://
www.cnn.com/2016/01/11/health/toxic-tap-water-ﬂint-michigan/.
36.

Interestingly, in Flint it was a clinician who decided to go beyond individual cases and look
at blood levels more broadly who helped to expose the problem. See Sanjay Gupta, Ben
Tinker & Tim Hume, ‘Our Mouths were Ajar’: Doctor’s Fight to Expose Flint’s Water Crisis, CNN (Jan.
22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/21/health/ﬂint-water-mona-hanna-attish/.

37.

This is not to say that plaintiﬀs cannot succeed in holding defendants responsible for
actions that operate on a population level. In the case of Flint, several lawsuits, including
class action lawsuits, have been ﬁled. See Ray Sanchez, Flint Water Crisis Lawsuits: 5 Things to
Know, CNN, (Mar. 11, 2016), www.cnn.com/2016/03/11/us/ﬂint-crisis-lawsuits-ﬁve-things/.
Nevertheless, these lawsuits face a range of hurdles, including jurisdictional and immunity
defenses that upon closer inspection may reﬂect the individualistic perspective that
permeates much of contemporary jurisprudence. For a fuller discussion of how the failure
to appreciate populations aﬀects issues of jurisdiction, immunity, and tort liability, see
PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 65-68, 219-43; Wendy E. Parmet, Valuing the Unidentiﬁed:
The Potential of Public Health Law, 53 JURIMETRICS 255, 274-76 (2013).

38.

Geoffrey Rose, Sick Individuals and Sick Populations, 30 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 427, 428-29
(2001).
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whole distribution of exposure in a favourable direction.”39 Such interventions
are often said to be “upstream,” as they seek at a broad population level to
reduce or prevent health risks rather than respond to illnesses that occur in
discrete, identiﬁed individuals. Thus the population perspective emphasizes
prevention rather than treatment or compensation. And in law, it shifts the
emphasis from individual choice to social context.
Space precludes a full discussion of how the population perspective aligns
with and diﬀers from the more individualistic perspective that is predominant
in contemporary American jurisprudence.40 Suﬃce it to say that although traces
of the population perspective can be found in our legal corpus (the leading
public health law case Jacobson v. Massachusetts comes most readily to mind),41 its
incorporation into legal analysis sheds important light on myriad doctrines,
including causation in tort law, justiciability,42 and criminal responsibility.
Nevertheless, because the norms that inform population-based analysis are
already embedded in our legal system, and the questions asked are similar
to those traditionally asked by legal scholars (the legitimate scope of law’s
coerciveness), the scholarship that results from the injection of the population
perspective into legal analysis remains easily identiﬁable as legal scholarship.
The third deﬁning attribute of population-based legal analysis, and
one closely connected to public health’s population perspective, is the
incorporation of public health’s methodologies into legal reasoning. In its
thinnest sense, this means as the legal realists would have it, that the empirical
ﬁndings of public health science, especially epidemiology, should matter
in a genuine way to our understanding and critiques of law. After all, if the
preservation of population health is one of law’s goals, the empirical question
of how law aﬀects health should matter.43 Often today it does not, as both
scholars and, more disturbingly, courts throw around claims that particular
laws will help or harm public health with little heed to the scientiﬁc basis,
indeed even the plausibility, of their claims.44 Yet population-based legal
39.

Id. at 431. This is not to say that public health practice has relied exclusively on populationlevel interventions. To the contrary, the ﬁeld has often employed far more individualistic
approaches, including some that have (problematically from a population perspective)
blamed individuals for their own health conditions. See Wendy E. Parmet, Dangerous
Perspectives the Perils of Individualizing Public Health Problems, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 83 (2009).

40.

For a fuller discussion, see PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 5-22.

41.

197 U.S. 11 (1905).

42.

See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at passim.

43.

This is not to say that it should be dispositive in any particular case. Population-based legal
analysis does not claim that population health is law’s only goal, or that otherwise binding
legal rules should be not trump population health outcomes.

44.

This tendency to issue unfounded assumptions about a law’s impact on public health
seems especially apparent in some recent First Amendment cases. See, e.g., Thompson
v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (rejecting the government’s contention that
a ban on advertising by compounding pharmacies was necessary to prevent large-scale
compounding); K. Outterson, Regulating Compounding Pharmacies After NECC, 367 NEW ENGL. J.
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analysis demands more than the good faith use of public health science. In
its most robust sense, the incorporation of public health methodologies in
law opens the way for the adoption of a probabilistic and inductive mode of
analysis that recognizes that “both risks and beneﬁts are generally matters of
degree [and] the law must accept that few things in life are either absolute
or deﬁnite.”45 Thus there is reduced reliance on deductive reasoning and a
greater appreciation that if law is to achieve its population health goals it must
recognize the complex, contingent continuum of risks, care about empirical
facts, and abandon its reliance on a formalism that is oblivious to the population
impacts of its decisions. In short, population-based legal analysis oﬀers a form
of interdisciplinarity that integrates law with public health, merging public
health’s normative, ontological, and methodological aspects into traditional
doctrinal analysis. In this sense it is not simply the application of law to public
health; nor is it the use of public health science to study law. It is the union
of law and public health around issues that relate to public health and, even
more broadly, to any and all legal issues that aﬀect the health or well-being of
populations. In other words, to all of law’s domain.

That population-based legal analysis oﬀers a bridge across the chasm of
interdisciplinarity does not mean, however, that the approach lack challenges.
Space prevents a full discussion, but let me mention two that are especially
daunting.
The ﬁrst relates to what I have called a population health norm. As was
noted above, population-based legal analysis does not presume that health is
the only or highest objective of the legal system, only that it is a legal norm with
deep legal roots. Still, for the norm to have any content, we need to know what
we mean by population health, and that itself may elude us. Without diving
deeply here into that question, let me simply note that the claim that public
health is a legal norm demands that we do not limit our understanding of
human health to very narrow biomedical conceptions. If health is understood
solely as the absence of biological pathologies, the reach of the public health
norm might not extend broadly across legal issues.46 Yet, if we adopt a very
broad deﬁnition of health, such as the that oﬀered by the World Health
Organization, which deﬁnes health as the “state of complete physical, mental,
MED. 1969 (2012) (suggesting that the New England Compounding Pharmacy ﬁasco which
led to the deaths of 64 people might not have happened if the Court had not struck down
FDA regulations in Thompson).
45.

PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 59.

46.

Sridhar Venkatpuram raises a somewhat similar point in discussing the normative
implications of diﬀerent deﬁnitions of health. SRIDHAR VENKATPURAM, HEALTH JUSTICE: AN
ARGUMENT FROM THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 41-72 (2011). On the other hand, even a narrow
deﬁnition of health can support a broad population health norm if we accept that biological
health is in large measure socially determined. See PARMET, POPULATIONS, supra note 2, at 8.
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and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or inﬁrmity,”47 we
risk conﬂating health with well-being and population health with the common
good. In that case, the unique contributions of the discipline of public health
to population-based legal analysis may fade. As John Coggon astutely argued
in his book What Makes Health Public?, public health’s normativity can easily
elide into a theory of the state.48 Sometimes I think that’s the point of the
analysis, but that raises challenges for the claim that population-based legal
analysis is the integration of law and public health, as opposed to but a version
of liberal theory by another name.49
Yet if, on the one hand, population-based legal analysis risks losing its own
interdisciplinary identity by collapsing into political theory, it also risks, on the
other hand, remaining too specialized to gain traction beyond the public health
law community. Although I have shown how population-based legal analysis
can be and is broader in its scope than public health law, the approach remains
closely identiﬁed with public health law which, despite its recent renaissance,50
is still a small and relatively marginalized ﬁeld of legal scholarship.
This is too bad. Although it goes too far to suggest that public health
law is the most important ﬁeld of law, public health law interrogates some
of the most critical questions regarding the relationships among law, human
society, and our own mortality. It also helps us to recognize our profound and
inevitable interdependency. Our health depends more on factors that aﬀect
the populations we comprise than on the choices we make. Likewise, although
public health science is not the only nonlegal discipline suitable for integration
with the law, its merger with law oﬀers new perspectives on core legal issues,
unearthing ancient yet still relevant chords in our jurisprudence. But even for
those uninterested in public health, the merger oﬀers insight into how we can
bridge the interdisciplinary divide.

47.

Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185,
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf.

48.

JOHN COGGON, WHAT MAKES HEALTH PUBLIC? A CRITICAL EVALUATION
AND POLITICAL CLAIMS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 146-48 (2012).

49.

Id. As Coggon suggests, if the normativity of public health collapses into a more general
theory of the state, public health itself provides no unique normative content. In that sense,
the population perspective can be viewed as simply one response to the question “why have
law,” instead of the merger of law and public health.

50.

Berman, supra note 23, at 46-47.
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